Does US need a Cyber Force to tackle China, Russia?

US lawmakers closer to creating new independent military branch to repel China and Russia’s rising cyber threats and disinformation

by GABRIEL HONRADA
June 3, 2024

The US is considering creating an independent Cyber Force. Modern War Institute photo

The US is moving to establish a new Cyber Force to close emerging cyberspace defense gaps with near-peer rivals Russia and China, both of which are blending cyber and information operations to strategic effect.

Late last month, multiple media outlets reported that the US Congress is considering establishing an independent Cyber Force as part of the 2025 defense authorization bill, a response to long-held concerns about the current cyber defense structure.

An amendment, led by Representative Morgan Luttrell and included in the House Armed Services Committee’s markup, mandates a National Academy of Sciences study on creating the proposed new military branch.

The proposal, which has passed the committee and awaits a full House vote, seeks to address the inadequacies and complexities of the existing US military cyber formations, as highlighted by various studies and analysts.

The proposed Cyber Force aims to enhance cyber operations, recruitment and retention, which are currently hampered by being dispersed across multiple service branches.

If approved, the new branch could be established by 2027, following further legislative and administrative procedures. The development underscores the perceived urgent need for a dedicated cyber defense mechanism in the face of escalating global cyber threats.

The proposed Cyber Force aims to streamline the organizational framework for US cyber capabilities, emphasizing a unified recruitment, training and retention framework to harness and elevate cyber expertise in a digital battlespace.

In March 2024, Asia Times discussed the pros and cons of establishing a separate Cyber Force. Proponents argue that current military structures are inadequate for recruiting, training and retaining cyber talent, and that personnel shortages and fragmented approaches are hindering cyber readiness.

Critics argue that a separate Cyber Force may introduce new inefficiencies and that the existing US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) could suffice with significant restructuring, emphasizing the complex interdependencies of cyberspace with other military domains.

They point out potential redundancies and coordination challenges, suggesting that a new separate service could detract from operational efficiency and integration with traditional military functions.

An independent Cyber Force could however bridge the gap between US cyber and information operations, reflecting a convergence in these interrelated fields.

In a June 2021 article in the peer-reviewed Advances in Military Technology journal, Zsolt Haig states that cyber operations now transcend traditional computer network operations (CNO) through a multifaceted approach that integrates technical and cognitive information capabilities.

Haig notes that cyber operations involve threats such as malware, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, physical disruptions through electronic warfare (EW) and cognitive manipulations via social media.

He points out that the synergy between these layers enables sophisticated strategies where electronic jamming and cyber intrusions are coupled with targeted disinformation campaigns.

Consequently, he says cyber operations are now pivotal in both military and civilian spheres, illustrating a seamless blend of technological exploitation and psychological influence.

However, the US may already be losing ground in information operations vis-ŕ-vis Russia and China, with the latter exploiting the limits of democratic values, social media, domestic politics and budget cuts in US information warfare capabilities.

In a May 2024 Defense One article, Patrick Tucker states that the US has inherent resistance to actively influencing perceptions. This resistance stems from the belief that a nation with elected leadership and a free press should not need to engage in such activities beyond simply presenting the truth.

He notes that this stance has historically confined influence operations to a small segment of the special operations community, limiting its scope and impact.

He also says the digital media landscape has evolved, with individualized streams replacing credible national broadcasts, allowing adversaries to exploit social media to reach potentially billions with tailored messages and undermine trust in Western institutions, including the US military.

As Tucker mentioned, Jason Schenker, chairman of the Futurist Institute, says the subjective nature of reality on social media platforms further complicates the US’s ability to maintain a coherent national identity and counter disinformation.

Additionally, Tucker says domestic political dynamics pose a challenge, as efforts to combat foreign influence campaigns can be misconstrued as partisan politics.

Tucker mentions budget cuts to information warfare capabilities across various government agencies undermine these efforts, signaling a need for a more centralized and authoritative approach to elevating information warfare and influence activities.

He points out successful Russian information operations in Niger and Slovakia, which he argues succeeded in installing governments hostile to US interests, and Russian information operations to shape the battlespace before its 2014 annexation of Crimea.

In the case of China, Dan Blumenthal and other writers note in a May 2024 American Enterprise Institute report that the US’s myopic focus on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan overlooks the possibility that China can achieve reunification with Taiwan using other means.

Such means include economic enticement and coercion against the US and Taiwan, eroding the legitimacy of the Taiwanese people through propaganda and military threats, sowing fear and doubt in the Taiwanese population and using information campaigns to degrade US political will to support Taiwan.

While not a panacea to US information warfare and influence operations woes, an independent Cyber Force can help plug gaps in US influence operations, leveraging unified cyber operations expertise to counter disinformation efforts.

In an August 2022 MIT News article, Kylie Foy notes the efforts of Mary Zurko, an MIT Lincoln Laboratory cybersecurity researcher, to leverage technology to counteract influence operations by foreign adversaries to spread false information online to disrupt US democratic ideals.

Foy notes that, as with cyberattacks, influence operations follow a “kill chain” to exploit predictable weaknesses, pointing out Zurko’s idea that studying and reinforcing cyber weaknesses can also work against influence operations.

She mentions that Lincoln Laboratory uses “source tending” to reinforce the early stages of the kill chain of influence operations. This approach involves identifying and amplifying divisive narratives and building accounts to spread them. It includes machine learning to study digital personas, computational models to detect deepfakes and tools to analyze the influence of specific social media accounts.

Foy mentions that Zurko is leading the creation of a counter-influence operations test bed—a simulated social media environment to test counter-technologies and measure their impact on human operators tasked with identifying disinformation campaigns.

She notes that the initiative underscores the need for a full-system approach that combines human-centered and technical defenses against disinformation, calling for collaboration across disciplines like sociology, psychology, policy and law alongside cybersecurity experts.